ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the world represents the most important regulatory change for financial reporting in recent years. In 2005, the European Union member countries, Australia, and New Zealand required all publicly listed firms to switch to IFRS for financial reporting purposes. This move increased the pressure for Korean firms to switch from domestic accounting standards to IFRS with enhanced transparency and comparability of accounting numbers for international investors. In response to this increased pressure, Korean government required publicly listed firms and financial institutions in Korea to adopt IFRS by the end of 2011.
This study investigates how the recent mandatory adoption of IFRS affects financial analysts' information environment, specifically the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts in Korean market. Financial ana lysts are among the most important and sophisticated users of financial reporting service, and therefore examining the effects of IFRS adoption on analysts would enhance our understanding of the consequences of IFRS adoption. Especially, IFRS adoption in Korea provides a great opportunity to examine the issue because IFRS adoption produce more significant differences in financial reporting practices in Korea than many other countries where IFRS adoption has taken places. Before IFRS adoption, the primary financial statements of Korean firms required to be disclosed are standalone (unconsolidated) financial statements. However, IFRS adoption designate consolidated financial statements as the primary financial statements, which exert a strong influence on Kore an firms' financial reporting. Although many previous studies examined the issue, it is still controversial how mandatory IFRS adoption would affect financial analysts. On the one hand, proponents of IFRS claim that IFRS adoption has improved analysts' information environment, on the grounds that IFRS enhances the disclosure quality and transparency and/or increases the comparability of financial reporting (Bae, Tan, & Welker, 2008; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008) . On the other hand, opponents argue that IFRS adoption render financial reporting less informative, because "one size fits all" IFRS might be less reflective of domestic firms' unique financial position and operating performance (Ball, 2006) and thereby, IFRS adoption reduce the quality of analysts ' information.
Hypothesis
Our first hypothesis is about the impacts of IFRS adoption on the forecasts quality i.e. accuracy of financial analysts in Korea. The mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea might enhance the comparability and transparency of financial statements and therefore, improve analysts' forecast quality. This reasoning leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The mandatory adoption of IFRS is positively associated with the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts.
Previous studies investigate whether IFRS adoption enhance analysts' information environment by examining absolute forecast errors, forecast dispersion, and the number of analysts following a firm. However, it is not clear whether they are truly caused by the improvements in analysts' information sets because there could be possible alternative causes. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) argue that a firm's reporting incentive is the primary factor that determines the informativeness of accounting statements. Byard et al. (2011) highlight the important role of enforcement regimes and firm-level reporting incentives in determining the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption. Therefore, the change after IFRS adoption might be generated by the change in firms' reporting incentives instead of the changes in analysts' information sets.
According to opponents of IFRS, IFRS has increased managerial flexibility and discretion especially due to the lack of implementation guidance and poor enforcement (Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Leuz, 2003) . Also, earnings management might have a meaningful role in determining accounting quality surrounding mandatory IFRS adoption 1 . Ahmed et al. (2013) and Chen, Tang, Jiang, and Lin (2010) find evidence of an increase in income smoothing and a reduction in timeliness of loss recognition following mandatory IFRS adoption. Also, Ahmed et al. (2013) find a significant increase in aggressive reporting of some accruals and fail to find an evidence of the reduction in earnings management. These evidences suggest that there are increased opportunities for earnings management following mandatory IFRS adoption. Furthermore, several studies do cument that firms manage their earnings towards a certain target such as analysts' forecasts (Bannister & Newman, 1996; Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999; Matsumoto, 2002; Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003; Hutton, 2005) . Therefore, the documented increase in analysts' forecast accuracy could be a consequence of increased opportunities of earnings management to match their analysts' forecasts. If the improvement of forecasts accuracy after IFRS adoption is brought by the increased opportunities in earnings management, then the improved accuracy would be associated with increased level of earnings management. This consideration produces our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The increase in analysts' forecasts accuracy after mandatory IFRS adoption is associated wit h the increased level of earnings management.
In order to gain more detailed understanding of analysts' information environment, we also examine if the improved accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts is attributable to the increased precision of analyst s' information sets. Analysts generally utilize financial statements data as the main inputs to their models for earnings forecasts. Therefore, we are interested in examining whether and how mandatory IFRS adoption affects analysts' information sets for earnings forecasting. Byard and Shaw (2003) find that high-quality annual and quarterly reports increase the precision of both analysts' public information and private information 2 . Kim and Shi (2012) report that the added disclosures following voluntary IFRS adoption contribute to the enhanced precision of analysts' information set. Based on these findings, we conjecture that mandatory IFRS adoption sharpens the precision of analysts' information and therefore improves the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts. Therefore, we set our third hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The increase in analysts' forecasts accuracy after mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with the increased precision of analysts' information sets. Previous literature reports that the level of disclosure of a firm is positively related to the analyst coverage for the firm (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999) . This relation is confirmed with international evidence (Hope 2003a; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003) . However, the empirical evidence for analyst coverage in IFRS literature are somewhat mixed. Byard et al. (2011) find that mandatory adopters exhibit no statistically significant change in analyst following in the European Union. Unlike Byard et al. (2011 ), Tan et al. (2011 find that mandatory IFRS adoption attracts more foreign analysts. These findings suggest that benefits from IFRS adoption might not be uniform across countries.
Unlike other countries which have adopted IFRS, Korea experienced significant changes in accounting practices especially in primary financial statements. In post-IFRS period, we can expect that financial analysts are required to spend more time and efforts in providing accurate forecasts, because they have to use consolidated financial statements. Therefore, we conjecture that mandatory IFRS adoption reduces the number of analysts following. This expectation leads to our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: IFRS mandatory adoption is associated with decreased coverage by analysts.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Sample Selection
We tests our hypotheses using a sample of Korean listed firms over the period from 2000 to 2013. We obtain annual financial data from KisValue III and one-year ahead earnings per share forecasts from Fn-guide 3 . Following Clement (1999) , we make sure that no earnings forecasts are issued earlier than one year before the given fiscal The Clute Institute year-end. We also exclude forecasts that are released after actual earnings announcement dates or 3 months after the given fiscal year-end.
We restrict our sample to non-financial and non-utility firms because financial and utility firms operate in highly regulated industries with different accounting rules from those in other industries. We exclude firms that adopted IFRS before 2011 because they reported financial statements for the 2010 fiscal year in accordance with IFRS. Further, each firm-year observation is required to have a fiscal year ending in December in order to ensure homogeneity across sample firms. We exclude firms without finan cial or stock return data available. This procedure results in our final sample of 3,715 firm-year observations. We control for the influence of observations with extreme value by winsorizing dependent and independent variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
Measuring Analysts' Information Environment
We measure the characteristics of analysts' information environment using Absolute forecast errors, Forecast dispersion, and Analyst coverage (FLLW) (Byard et al., 2011; Kim & Shi, 2012) . 
Measuring Information Precision
We follow Barron et al. (1998) to empirically measure the precision of information that analyst incorporate into their earnings forecasts. Our main test uses the precision of total (public and private) information, K, as the dependent variable. We also examine the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption on the precision of public information that is common to all analysts (PUBLIC), the precision of private information that is idiosyncratic to an individual analyst (PRIVATE), and analysts' consensus which is the average proportion of analysts' public to total information (CONSENSUS).
where SE = the expected squared error in the mean forecast D = the expected forecast dispersion N = the number of forecasts for firm i in year t
We limit our data to the most recent one-year-ahead forecasts of annual earnings. We use the within-year fractional rank of K (denoted as RK) to reduce the influence of outliers and skewness. Specifically, we transform PUBLIC, PRIVATE and CONSENSUS into [0, 1] decile ranks 5 .
Research Design
To test Hypothesis 1 and investigate differences in the properties of analysts' forecasts surrounding IFRS mandatory compliance we construct a regression equation. Our approach follows prior studies that employ the characteristics of analysts' forecasts as proxies for the information environment (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999; Lang et al., 2003) . We use two measures to capture analysts' information environment for a firm: absolute forecast errors, forecast dispersion. This yields the following regression equation:
AFE and DISP are the absolute forecast errors and the forecast dispersion for firm i and year t, respectively. IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i adopted IFRS in year t. We only include mandatory adopters in our sample because firms that have already voluntarily switched to IFRS prior to the mandate may not exhibit significant effects when IFRS reporting becomes mandatory (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008) . The key coefficient of interest, β1, captures the difference in analysts' information environment between the test and control firms, and therefore, the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts' forecasts accuracy. If IFRS adoption improves the accuracy of analysts' forecasts, then β1 would have significantly negative value.
Previous research (Clement, 1999; Duru & Reeb, 2002) suggests various factors that might affect forecast errors and dispersion. Control variables include the level of absolute accruals (ABACC), the natural logarithm of total asset (SIZE), debt ratio (LEV), reporting negative income (LOSS), current year's return on assets (ROA), forecast horizon (HORIZON), and analyst coverage (FLLW). Specifically, ABACC is calculated as absolute value of income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations deflated by total assets. LEV is the ratio of short and long term debt to total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has negative earnings for the fiscal year and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. HORIZON is the natural logarithm of the number of days between the forecast issuing date and the fiscal year-end. We measure analyst coverage (FLLW) as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts making EPS forecasts of a firm. We also include industry fixed effects (IND) and use adjusted standard errors for firm-level clustering to mitigate serial correlation within a firm (Ahmed et al., 2013) .
Second equation is to test Hypothesis 2 and examine whether earnings management can explain the changes in forecast accuracy. Specifically, we investigate whether forecast accuracy improves more for IFRS adopter firms that have large absolute discretionary accruals. Prior studies find that firms followed by analysts who issue earnings forecasts exhibit lower earnings management (DeFond & Hung, 2003; McInnis & Collins, 2011) . Control variables used in (8) are also included:
We estimate absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995) . If the increase of forecast accuracy is caused by earnings management, then β3 would be significantly negative.
We test Hypothesis 3 and study the relation between the precision of analysts' information sets (RK) and IFRS adoption to check whether mandatory IFRS adoption increases the precision of the analysts' information sets. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation:
In Equation (10), we include several control variables used in previous studies (Byard & Shaw, 2003; Chung, Kim, & Kim, 2004; Kim & Yi, 2011) . All variables are as defined above.
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we estimate a regression equation which links IFRS adoption to analyst coverage. We incorporate various determinants of analyst coverage identified in previous literature in our multivariate regression equation as control variables (Bhushan, 1989; Hope, 2003a Hope, , 2003b Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lang et al., 2003) . This yields the following regression equation:
All variables are as defined above. If IFRS adoption is associated with decreased coverage by analysts, then our fourth hypothesis predicts a significantly negative value for β1. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for various subsamples and univariate tests for the difference in mean and median between the IFRS adoption sample (IFRS=1) and non-adoption sample (IFRS=0). The mean (median) absolute forecast errors (AFE), forecast dispersion (DISP) are 0.073 (0.018) and 0.006 (0.000) respectively for the full sample. FLLW is analyst coverage and calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts m aking a n E PS forecast of a firm. K is measured as the sum of the precision of public information (PUBLIC) and private information (PRIVATE) and then we use the within-year fractional rank of K to calculate RK. IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i's financial stateme nts a r e prepared under IFRS in year t, zero otherwise. ABSDA is measured using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) . ABACC is calcula t e d as absolute value of income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm o f total assets. LEV is the ratio of short and long term debt to total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has negative earnings f o r the fiscal year, zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. HORIZON is the natural lo garith m o f t he number of days between the forecast issuing date and the fiscal year-end. T he symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Non-adoption sample is larger than IFRS adoption sample in the level of absolute forecast errors (AFE) and forecast dispersion (DISP). This suggests that mandatory IFRS adoption leads to decreased absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion. The mean (median) natural logarithm of the number of analyst (FLLW), is 0.899 (0.693) for the full sample, while it is 0.585 and 1.005 (0.000 and 0.693) for the IFRS adoption (IFRS=1) and non-adoption sample (IFRS=0), respectively. Both t-and z-tests show that FLLW is significantly lower for IFRS adoption period than for non-adoption period, implying that mandatory IFRS adoption affects financial analysts' behaviors and makes them to cover less firms with IFRS adoption. On the other hand, the precision of analyst information sets (RK) exhibits no significant difference between the two subsamples, which indicates that the information precision in IFRS adoption period is not meaningfully different from that in non-adoption period. The level of absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) and absolute accruals (ABACC) are different across the two subsamples. We find that absolute discretionary accruals and absolute accruals are reduced significantly from years before IFRS adoption to years after IFRS adoption. The univariate analyses provides primitive evidence for our research questions, partially s uggesting that mandatory IFRS adoption might improve analysts' information environment.
We also find that size (SIZE) and frequency of net loss (LOSS) increase, but debt ratio (LEV), profitability (ROA), and the forecast horizon (HORIZON) decrease substantially after IFRS adoption. All variables are as defined in T able 1. T he symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 3 shows the estimated results of regression equation (8). We also present the estimated coefficients for different subsamples. Columns (1) and (2) show the result for the whole sample period. Columns (3) and (4) show the estimates when year 2009 and 2010 are excluded. During these two years, some Korean firms had voluntarily adopted IFRS. Columns (5) and (6) show the estimation result over the period from 2007 to 2013. This period is regarded to be homogeneous in terms of economic conditions and therefore more comparable 6 .
As shown in Table 3 , the mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea reduces the absolute forecast error and forecast dispersion substantially. The negative coefficients on IFRS are statistically significant at 1 percent level in models (1), (2), (3), and (5) and at 5 percent level in model (4). These results imply that forecast accuracy improves significantly after mandatory IFRS adoption. This finding is valid in full sample pe riod as well as in various subperiods 7 , and supports our first hypothesis. Table 4 provides the estimation results for equation (9). Here, we test whether the improvements in analysts' forecast accuracy after IFRS adoption are attributable to increased opportunities for earnings management. In full sample, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term IFRS×ABSDA is negative but not statistically significant. Only in the sub-period without year 2009 and 2010 the coefficient is negative and significant at the 10 percent level (model (2)).
In the subsample of KOSPI firms, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative but not significant.
However, the coefficient on the interaction term IFRS×ABSDA is negative and significant in the subsample of KOSDAQ firms. This is consistent with the earnings management explanation as it indicates that the reduction in the forecast errors after IFRS adoption is more pronounced for firms which have large discretionary accruals, in other words, more opportunities to manage earnings. This empirical evidence suggests that the improved analyst forecast accuracy after IFRS adoption is mainly driven by earnings manipulation in KOSDAQ firms but not in KOSPI firms. This result is partially consistent with Hypothesis 2. All variables are as defined in T able 1. Robust t -statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 5 presents the analyses results for regression equation (10) where we examine the impacts of the mandatory IFRS adoption on information precision. The coefficient estimate of IFRS are significantly positive in full sample and KOSPI subsample (model (1) through (6)). This shows that mandatory IFRS adoption enhances corporate disclosure and improves the precision of analysts' information sets. This finding is consistent with the argument that analysts are encouraged to incorporate more precise information caused by IFRS adoption into their earnings forecasts. However, for KOSDAQ firms, the coefficient of IFRS is negative and statistically not significant across all sample period (model (7) through (9)). These results largely support the view that the imp rovements in analysts' forecast accuracy is brought by improved precision of analysts' information sets after IFRS adoption. We investigate the effects of IFRS adoption on the number of analysts following a firm using Equation (11). The results are reported in Table 6 . The all of the estimated coefficients on IFRS are negative and significant at 1 percent level. The number of analysts following a firm significantly decreases after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in all subsamples and sample periods. These results indicate that the chang e of primary financial statement from unconsolidated ones to consolidated ones caused by IFRS adoption makes financial analysts to spend more time an d efforts in providing earnings forecasts and, as consequence, the level of analyst coverage is substantially reduced. All variables are as defined in T able 1. Robust t -statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
An Alternative Measure for Earnings Management: Total Accrual
In testing Hypothesis 2, we use absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) for the earnings management measure. We check the robustness of our results by employing an alternative measure. Specifically, we replace absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) with absolute accruals (ABACC) in Equation (9) and estimate the regression equation. Absolute Accruals (ABACC) is the absolute difference between net income and cash flow, deflated by total asset. In this unreported test, the results are similar to those reported in Table 4 .
Analyses of Analysts' Public and Private Information
Our main interest is the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption on the precision of total information (public and private). In this subsection, we examine whether the improvements in the precision of total information is attributable to the improvements in public information or private information.
Conventional wisdom states that enhanced disclosures and transparency after IFRS adoption would improve analysts' public information. However, the theoretical relation between mandatory IFRS adoption and the precision of private information is ambiguous. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) document that increa sed level of firm disclosures discourages analysts' incentives to produce private information. If this is the case, mandatory IFRS adoption is unlikely to improve the precision of private information. In contrast, Verrecchia (1994, 1997 ) report tha t increased disclosure level could complement analysts' private knowledge, allowing analysts to develop more private information. Lundholm (1991) finds that increased public information facilitates the allocation of private information. In this case, mandatory IFRS adoption might lead to more precise private information. The Clute Institute Byard and Shaw (2003) and Byard et al. (2011) show that enhanced disclosure increases the precision of both public and private information sets, implying that analysts' public information complements their private information. In order to empirically investigate this issue, we use Barron et al. (1998) measures as defined in equations (4), (5) and (6) to capture the precision of analysts' public and private information.
In examining the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts' public information, private information, and analysts' consensus, we employ the decile ranks of PUBLIC, PRIVATE and CONSENSUS to reduce the skewness problem. We also include all the control variables used in equ ation (10).
In untabulated results, the coefficient of IFRS is positive and statistically significant in the regression with PRIVATE as dependent variable, which implies that mandatory IFRS adoption encourages analysts to incorporate private information into their earnings forecasts. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant in the regression where PUBLIC is the dependent variable. This evidence suggests that IFRS adoption is not likely to improve the quality of public information.
As a result, it appears that improvements in the precision of total information, as reported in Table 5 , is attributable to the improved precision of private information not public information. The enhancements in analysts' private information is consistent with previous findings that increased level of firm disclosures improves analysts' private information (Frankel, Kothari, & Weber, 2006; Barron et al., 1998) . Also, the coefficient on IFRS is negatively significant in the regression with CONSENSUS as dependent variable. This indicates that IFRS adoption is more likely to increase the precision of analysts' private information than that of analysts' public information.
In short, the results show that mandatory IFRS adoption improves the analysts' information env ironment through the increased precision of private information rather than public information. This finding suggests that the positive association between the precision of total information and IFRS adoption is caused by the complementary relation between public and private information.
CONCLUS ION
This study investigates the effects of the 2011 mandatory adoption of IFRS by Korean firms on financial analysts' information environment. First, we find that mandatory IFRS adoption is followed by statistically significant decreases in analysts' forecast errors and forecast dispersion, supporting the claim that mandatory IFRS adoption improves analysts' information environment. Second, we further test if the increases in analysts' forecast accuracy is the consequence of more opportunities to manage earnings towards analysts' forecasts after IFRS adoption. We find empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture, but in KOSDAQ firms only. Third, we find that mandatory IFRS adoption improves the precision of analysts' information sets in full sample firms and KOSPI firms. However, this does not hold for KOSDAQ firms. Finally, we find that the mandatory IFRS adoption reduces the degree of analyst coverage. In summary, mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea improves the information sets, especially for private information, promotes analysts to incorporate the improved information into their earnings forecasts, and increases the accuracy of forecasts especially for KOSPI firms. 
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